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In matters involving uncertainty, probability theory, and its ap-
plied companion, statistical decision theory, have often proved to be
valuable aids to rational decisionmaking. Thus, it is natural to expect
that the conceptual tools furnished by these theories might also be ap-
plicable to the analysis or practice of legal decisionmaking.' Indeed,
the language of the law, replete with grammatical variants of the very
term "probability," and with phrases such as "more likely than not"
and "beyond a reasonable doubt," seems to invite explication in formal
probabilistic terms. Yet a number of arguments have been advanced in
opposition to such an undertaking. Some individuals, having encoun-
tered probability only in the narrow application of forecasting, have
concluded, for example, that only future uncertainties may be analyzed
probabilistically, and that issues dealt with by the law, which character-
istically involve uncertainty about the past, must therefore lie beyond
the reach of such analysis.2 Others, acquainted only with the interpre-
tation of probabilities as relative frequencies attached to sequences of
repeated "experiments," have noted that triers of fact face situations
too idiosyncratic to allow the application of statistical generalizations,3
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1. See, e.g., Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identication Evidence, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1970); Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Facofnding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065
(1968); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1977).
2. For an incisive correction of this misconception, see Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Preci-
sion and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
3. In a criminal trial, for example, it is clearly erroneous to view the probability of a defend-
ant's guilt as the fraction of times that an individual would be guilty in a large number of identical




and have concluded on these grounds that probability theory must be
inapplicable to legal decisionmaking.
To hold for the above reason that probability is inapplicable to
legal decisionmaking is to fail to appreciate that the axioms of
probability theory do not specify a fixed interpretation of probability
numbers, but rather a set of consistency conditions for the assignment
of such numbers. To equip a set of declarative sentences from some
field of inquiry such as science or law with a probability "measure" is
simply to assign to each sentence in the set a number between zero and
one, subject to the following restrictions: (1) logically equivalent
sentences must be assigned the same number; (2) self-contradictory
sentences must be assigned the number zero, and tautologies the
number one; and (3) if two sentences cannot be true simultaneously,
then their disjunction (the compound sentence formed by connecting
them with the word "or") must be assigned that number which is the
sum of the numbers assigned to its constituent sentences.
One way of generating such probability numbers, commonly used
in scientific inquiry, is to assign to an assertion the number expressing
the fraction of times the assertion is found to be true in a sequence of
experimental tests. In this case probability numbers express the rela-
tive frequencies with which assertions are found to be true.
As noted above, triers of fact will rarely have information suffi-
cient for assigning frequency-based probability numbers to contested
assertions. Their data, after hearing the evidence, consist of unquanti-
fled subjective degrees of belief in the assertions at issue. To assign
numerical measures to such degrees of belief, consistent with the axi-
oms of probability theory, might seem an impossible task. As a result
of the groundbreaking work of Savage4 and de Finetti,5 however, we
are fortunate to possess a method by which an individual may so quan-
tify his subjective degrees of belief.6 Probability numbers assigned by
this method measure what is, for the purposes of the law, the crucial
4. See L. SAVAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1972).
5. See de Finetti, Probabili,: Interprelations, in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 496 (D. Sills ed. 1968).
6. Roughly speaking, an individual quantifies his degree of belief in the truth of some asser-
tion by a process of self-interrogation involving the preferential ranking of certain bets. To do this
he makes use of comparisons with frequency-based probabilities connected with some simple en-
terprise such as choosing a card at random from a well-shuffled deck. He then asks himself a
series of questions ("Would I prefer betting on X's guilt to betting that the card will not be a
spade? Yes? Then I must assign X's guilt a probability greater than .75. Would I prefer betting
on X's guilt, even to betting that the card will not be the ace of spades?" and so on ) by which he
refines his subjective estimate of the probability of the contested assertion. Thus an individual's
subjective probabilities reflect his degrees of belief as manifested in his betting preferences.
1072 [V/ol. 1979:1071
BOOK REVIEW
characteristic of a contested proposition, namely, the degree of belief
accorded it by a trier of fact. Moreover, these numbers are assigned in
such a way that the general theorems of probability theory are avail-
able as inferential tools for legal decisionmaking.
Nevertheless, Laurence Tribe has contended that the explicit
quantification of forensic probabilities would be undesirable on
grounds of policy, arguing that such a practice would undermine the
finality with which legal proceedings are supposed to settle contested
issues.7 For example, it follows from the axioms of probability theory
that attaching a numerical weight p to one's belief in some material
proposition entails attaching the weight 1-p to belief in its negation.
The fact that there are some values of p that are less than 1 but still
compatible with belief "beyond a reasonable doubt" detracts from the
solemn assurance implicit in that standard by officially conceding that
it does not mean belief beyond a quantifiable doubt. Furthermore, the
authority of a verdict rendered on the basis of a "preponderance of
evidence," usually identified with the condition p > 1/2, fares even
worse in the light of probabilistic candor. Tribe also fears that if triers
of fact were encouraged to think in explicit mathematical terms, they
would give undue weight to statistical evidence (conveniently quanti-
fied for them by others) rather than attempt the difficult task of inte-
grating such evidence with other relevant considerations to arrive at a
fully informed subjective probability.8
Such arguments, based on a commitment to protecting the ritual
aspects of the legal process, depend on certain questionable assump-
tions about human intellect and psychology.
Is the ability of human beings to accept a legal standard that
declares final that which is not entirely free from doubt as fragile as
Tribe fears? Are juries so impressionable with regard to "hard" pieces
of numerical evidence as to warrant excluding such evidence from their
consideration? At present we lack the careful empirical studies re-
quired to answer these questions decisively. Even if Tribe's pessimism
should be confirmed by such studies, however, this would not rule out
the possibility of training jurors in the reasoning processes required to
deal with probabilistic evidence in a competent manner. We might,
therefore, still profitably study the probabilistic reasoning of an ideal
Bayesian subjectivist 9 juror, in the expectation of clarifying and evalu-
7. Tribe, supra note 2, at 1372-75.
8. Id. 1363.
9. A "Bayesian subjectivist" revises his subjective probability assignments in the light of
new evidence according to a formula (Bayes' Rule) discovered by the Reverend Thomas Bayes in
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ating actual practice from a theoretical, normative perspective.
In The Probable and the Provable, however, the philosopher L.
Jonathan Cohen' 0 aims to demolish the idea that classical probability
(which he calls "Pascalian probability") is even a theoretically appro-
priate model for the law's apparently probabilistic language. Cohen
pursues this task in a chapter entitled "Six Difficulties for a Pascalian
Account of Judicial Probability." The thrust of his argument is that the
language of forensic, or legal, probability differs so significantly in its
formal structure from that of Pascalian probability that no meaningful
parallels can be drawn. In particular, Cohen claims that a Pascalian
version of forensic probability is at odds with the legal rules that estab-
lish the standards of proof necessary for the acceptance of conjunctive
propositions, such as the degree of proof necessary to establish the con-
junction of proximate cause and injury in a tort action, and control
inferential argument, such as the rules setting the required standard of
proof in arguing from one proposition to an intermediary proposition,
and through this inference, to a conclusion. Since these two points lie
at the core of Cohen's presentation, it is important to examine them in
some detail.
1. The Dfficulty About Conjunction. In seeking to state forensic
probability in Pascalian terms, the first task is to specify a Pascalian
measure for the degree of belief in some material proposition M that is
justified by evidence E. The traditional choice for such a measure has
been the so-called "conditional probability" of M, given E," and it is
this choice that Cohen criticizes.
Let us first consider the Pascalian analysis of the notion of a pre-
1763. The simple intuition underlying this rule is that if the probability of a piece of evidence
increases with the truth of a contested proposition, the acceptance of the evidence as true should
increase the estimated probability of the contested proposition. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 1083-
91, for a lucid discussion of the algebraic details of Bayes' Rule.
10. Mr. Cohen is a Fellow at The Queen's College, Oxford University.
I1. As a simple illustration of conditional probability, consider a single toss of a fair, six-
sided die. Lacking any other information, we would assign an unconditional probability of36 = V2
to the assertion (M) that an odd number turns up. If, however, we know that a number greater
than or equal to 4 has turned up (E), this will lower our estimate of the probability of M to 3,
since only one of the numbers 4, 5, and 6 is odd. The number , is the conditional probability of
M, given E.
An equivalent formulation of conditional probability, which is often convenient for theoreti-
cal purposes, is as follows: The conditional probability of M, given E, is equal to the uncondi-
tional probability of M and E, divided by the unconditional probability of E. In the above
example, we could thus have calculated the unconditional probability that an odd number greater
than or equal to 4 turns up (V6) and divided this by the probability that a number greater than or
equal to 4 turns up (), arriving at (V6)/() = as the conditional probability.
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ponderance of evidence. Suppose that we are given material proposi-
tion M and evidence E, and that we abbreviate the assertion that M is
not the case by "not-M." Further, let us denote the conditional
probability of M, given E, by Pr[M,E], and the conditional probability
of not-M, given E, by Pr[not-M,E]. It follows from the axioms of
probability and the definition of conditional probablity that the sum of
these two numbers is always equal to one. 2 Therefore under the Pas-
calian theory, there is a preponderance of evidence for M if and only if
the conditional probability of M, given E, is greater than one-half.
Otherwise not-M is just as probable as or more probable than M.1 3
Now,ICohen argues, suppose that M, and M2 are component points of
plaintiff's contention in a civil case. (Suppose, for example, that it is a
tort action and M, proposes actual injury and M2 proposes proximate
causation.) The legal rule is that plaintiff prevails if he proves each
point by preponderance, that is, if he proves that Pr[M,,E] > 1/2 and
Pr[M2,E] > 1/2. But suppose, for example that Pr[M1,E] = .8 and
Pr[M2,E] = .6. The law in this case certainly regards plaintiff as having
proved his entire contention, M, and M2, injury and causation, by a
preponderance. If Pascalian probability were readily applicable to le-
gal decisionmaking in such a case, we would expect the conditional
probability of the conjunctive proposition M, and M2, given E, to be
"probable" as well, that is, greater than one-half. In fact, however,
under traditional Pascalian theory, the probability of the conjunctive
propositon M1 and M2, given the independence of M, from M2, is equal
to the product of their individual probabilities: .8 x .6 = .48.14 Thus,
what Cohen shows to be legally "probable" he also shows to be simul-
12. In symbols, we may express this as Pr[M,E] + Pr[not-M,E] = 1, or, Pr[not-M,E] = 1 -
Pr[M,E]. This is the so-called "complementarity principle" for conditional probabilities.
13. This is because "preponderance" amounts to the assertion that the conditional
probability of M, given E, is greater than the conditional probability of not-M, given E (Pr[M,E] >
Pr[not-M,E]). Since the sum of these two numbers is equal to one, the latter inequality holds
exactly when the conditional probability of M, given E, is greater than one-half (Pr[M,E] > ).
14. The universally applicable rule for computing the probability of a conjunction M, and
M2 , given E, is as follows:
PrIM 1 and M2 , E] = Pr[M 1, E] x PrIM2 , E and MI].
If, in the context of E, the truth of M1 has no bearing on the truth of M2 , that is, if M 2 is independ-
ent of MI, then
Pr[M 2 , E and MI] = PrIM 2 , E].
Hence, in the case of independence, we get the simplified special formula PrIM 1 and M2 , E] =
Pr[M 1, E] X Pr jM 2, El.
For the formally inclined reader, the mathematical derivation of the general product rule is as
follows: By the remarks in note 11 supra, we have
Pr[M 1 and M 2, E] = Pr[Mj and M 2 and E]
Pr[E]
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taneously improbable under traditional Pascalian analysis.
This tension between legal practice and the Pascalian model can
be approached in more than one way. An individual might concede on
the basis of this example that the Pascalian model is not always per-
fectly descriptive of legal practice, and simply view this as a defect in
the inferential rules of the law. This need not imply a wholesale rejec-
tion of the logic underlying legal practice, particularly if one is con-
vinced that examples like the foregoing occur in practice with
sufficiently low frequency. Several considerations suggest the reasona-
bleness of such a view.
First, such material propositions as injury and proximate causa-
tion, signified here by M, and M2, are rarely, if ever, independent.
Without the independence assumption, we must employ the more gen-
eral Pascalian multiplication rule Pr[M 1 and M2,E] = Pr[M1,E] x
Pr[M2, M, and E]. 5 If, as one would often expect, Pr[M 2, M, and E] is
sufficiently larger than Pr[M 2, E] to make the foregoing product greater
than one-half, the conjunction of M, and M2 would be "probable" in
both the legal and the Pascalian senses.
Second, defendants often dispute only one of the points in a con-
junctive complaint, for example, conceding that a plaintiff indeed suf-
fered injury, but denying the existence of proximate cause. This, in
Pascalian terms, results in the automatic assignment of the value 1 to
the probability of the uncontested point. In such cases there is no diffi-
culty about conjunction, given a probability greater than one-half for
the contested proposition.
Cohen explicitly considers the possibility of such mitigating fac-
tors, but remains unplacated. As long as, on a Pascalian analysis, there
remains the indisputable possibility of having to countenance an anom-
aly in the standards of conjunctive proof, no matter how remote, Cohen
asserts that the Pascalian model must be rejected.
2. The Doiculty About Inference Upon Inference. While in the
case of conjunction, the Pascalian model suggests that the existing rules
of legal proof are excessively loose, Cohen shows that this model occa-
- Pr[M I and E] X Pr[M2 and (M I and E)]
Pr[M1 and E] Pr[E]
Pr[M 1 and E] X Pr[M 2 and (M I and E)]
Pr[E] Pr[M 1 and E]
- Pr[MI, E]
15. See note 14 supra.
X Pr[M 2, M1 and El.
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sionally makes certain accepted legal limitations on inference upon in-
ference appear too strict. The simplest inferential arguments proceed
from evidence E to some intermediate proposition I, and then from E
and I to the target material proposition M. The legal rule in civil cases
requires that all inferences in the chain prior to the last must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, which translates into a probability very
close to one, while the last may be proved on preponderance, that is,
with a probability greater than one-half.'6 Let us say that the material
proposition (M) in this situation is the negligent failure to stop a car
resulting in the injury of a pedestrian, and that our evidence (E) is com-
prised of: (1) identification of the driver, (2) testimony that the car was
in good working order, (3) testimony that it was a clear day, (4) testi-
mony that traffic was light, and (5) the driver's claim that he failed to
see the pedestrian. Furthermore, let us say that I, the intermediate
proposition, is that there were no distractions for the driver. The infer-
ential argument thus runs from evidence that a specific person, driving
a well-maintained car on a traffic-free road on a clear day failed to see
a pedestrian, to the intermediate proposition that, given the evidence, it
is most probable that the driver had no significant distractions, to the
material proposition that, given the evidence and the probability that
the driver had no distractions, the driver was negligent in some fashion
for failing to stop. By the laws of Pascalian probability, it follows that
the ultimate probability of our material proposition M, given our evi-
dence E, is at least as large as the product of the probability of our
intermediate proposition I, given our evidence, and the probability of
M, given E and I" Suppose now that the probability of I, that the
driver had no distractions, given E, were quantified by a juror at the
level .75, and that the probability of our material proposition of negli-
gence, signified by M, given E and I, were quantified at the level .8. If
we apply the aforementioned inequality for the product of these num-
16. See J. WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE § 41, at 439 (3d ed. 1940) (quoting New York Life Ins.
Co. v. McNeely, 52 Ariz. 181, 193-96, 79 P.2d 948, 953-55 (1938)).
17. Symbolically, we have Pr[M, E] - Pr[I, El x Pr[M, E and I]. The proof is as follows:
Since the assertion M and E is true whenever the assertion M and E and I is true, it is clear that
Pr[M and E] -_ Pr[M and E and I].
Hence,Pr[M and El Pr[M and E and 1] Pr[E and I]
Pr[E] Pr[E] Pr[E and ]
that is, PrIM and E] Pr[E and I] Pr[M and E and I]
x
PrIE] Pr[E] PriE and 1]
According to the remarks in note 11 supra, this is equivalent to
Pr[M, E] Pr[I, El x Pr[M, E and I].
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bers, we find that the probability of M, given E, is at least as large as .6
and thus appears to satisfy, in Pascalian terms, the standard of a pre-
ponderance of evidence (.6 > 1/2). Nevertheless, this proof would be
unacceptable to the courts because the quantified probability of I, the
intermediary proposition, is .75 and as such is certainly not equal to the
significantly higher quantitative threshold for proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. Thus, legal standards again fall short of meshing with a
Pascalian system of probability.
Cohen observes, moreover, that the Pascalian system does not cap-
ture the asymmetry of the rule inference upon inference. If, for exam-
ple, Pr[I,E] = .999 and Pr[M, E and I] = .6, the courts allow the
inference from E to M. But if Pr[I,E] = .6 and Pr[M,E and I] = .999,
the inference from E to M is disallowed. Yet on the Pascalian account,
we have in both cases that Pr[M,E] > .5994. Thus, once again, the
Pascalian model fails to be descriptive of legal practice.
This failure, however, is surely not as disturbing as Cohen makes
it out to be. While, from the Pascalian point of view, the rule regulat-
ing inference upon inference may seem more conservative than neces-
sary, this could be regarded as offsetting those instances in which the
criteria for conjunctive proof appear to be too liberal. Also, one can
understand the asymmetry of the existing rule governing inference
upon inference as a necessary pragmatic modification of the rule the
Pascalian model would prescribe. Earlier inferences in a chain are
predicated on more remote, less specific conditions than later ones.
From the standpoint of caution, these earlier inferences should require
proof at a very high level of probability.
One may, in short, concede that the Pascalian model does not fit
legal practice on purely descriptive grounds, while continuing to view it
as a normative model, by which the departures of practice can be mea-
sured and perhaps rationalized on pragmatic grounds. From this per-
spective, the legal rules governing proof of conjunctions and arguments
based on inference upon inference appear as compromises with a Pas-
calian ideal, dictated by the fact that jurors are generally incapable of
applying the sophisticated multiplication rules of Pascalian
probability.'"
The recognition that the realities of legal practice may fall short of
the Pascalian ideal surely need not be the occasion for despair about
the general fairness of such practice.
Nonetheless, this way of dealing with the aforementioned difficul-
18. I am indebted to John Kaplan for convincing me of this point.
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ties is unacceptable to Cohen. For him, legal practice is the norm and
the goal is to construct a formal model that reflects this practice in
every detail. He proposes as an alternative to Pascalian probability a
method of weighing propositions according to the "inductive support"
that can be marshalled on their behalf. Roughly speaking, inductive
support accrues to a proposition to the extent that it survives a se-
quence of attempts to falsify it. The "inductive probability" of material
proposition M on evidence E is measured by the inductive support
available for the universal inference of M from E. Significantly, induc-
tive probabilities need not be real numbers; virtually any set of sequen-
tially ordered objects will suffice for inductive scorekeeping, for all that
is required is a way of keeping track of the level to which a proposition
has resisted falsification. Inductive probabilities cannot be combined
by anything resembling the usual arithmetical operations such as multi-
plication or addition, and hence there is no algebra of inductive
probabilities to speak of. 9
Given this paucity of mathematical structure, one might expect the
foundations of inductive probability to be quite elementary. They are,
to the contrary, forbiddingly complex, yet frustratingly vague at crucial
points.20 The important concept of relevance is furnished with no for-
mal inductive analysis.2 1 Furthermore, when Cohen begins his axio-
matic rendering of inductive probability, he lists nearly fifty
preliminary definitions and axioms, and this list is incomplete. He then
refers readers to his earlier book, The Implications of Induction,22 for
portions of the development, including proofs of a number of theorems
omitted from the present monograph.
Readers who, despite these roadblocks, wish to study Cohen's the-
ory of inductive probability should begin with Chapter 19, "An Induc-
tivist Resolution of Six Difficulties for a Pascalian Account of Judicial
Proof." Consider first his resolution of the conjunction problem. Co-
hen shows in an earlier chapter that the conjunction of two or more
propositions about the same subject matter has inductive probability
19. This precludes anything like Kaplan's Pascalian analysis of the interplay between stan-
dards of -proof, rules of evidence, and societal and individual utilities, as there is no way to multi-
ply inductive probabilities with utilities. See Kaplan, supra note 1.
20. In order to avoid certain inconsistencies in support-grading, for example, tests of a propo-
sition must be ordered in terms of decreasing "falsificatory potential." See L. COHEN, THE PROB-
ABLE AND THE PROVABLE 138-39 (1977). Cohen's informal discussion of this key notion does not
provide a convincing argument that such an ordering always exists.
21. By contrast, the Pascalian account of the relevance of E to M amounts simply to the
assertion that the conditional probability of M, given E, is greater than the unconditional
probability of M.
22. L. COHEN, THE IMPLICATIONS OF INDUCTION (1970).
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equal to the smallest of their individual probabilities.2" A probability
function with this property appears to mesh nicely with the legal stan-
dards for proof of conjuctions. The difficulty is that the notion of
"same subject matter" is a very restrictive one and Cohen admits that
the component points in a conjunctive complaint may not satisfy this
condition. In such cases, he says, "the probabilities of the component
elements are incommensurable, in which case no probability value can
be assigned to their conjunction and separate assignments to each must
suffice."'2 4 To be sure, this protects the inductive model from clashing
with legal practice, but it does so by opting to say nothing about legal
practice in the most interesting cases. Such a strategy is barely distin-
guishable from that of adopting a "partial Pascalian" model whereby
one computes the probability of a conjunction by the multiplication
rule only if no anomaly results.
Cohen's resolution of the problem of inference upon inference is
even less satisfying. His inductive model never furnishes an inductive
probability for M on evidence E, since the probabilities of the compo-
nent links are always "incommensurable."'25 In short, the inductivist
account provides no formal analysis of inference upon inference, thus
trivially avoiding the possibility of disparity between model and reality.
Pressed to say something to explain the legal rules governing inference
upon inference, Cohen relies on the same observations about remote-
ness and the desirability of caution cited earlier 6 to rationalize the le-
gal use of a criterion more stringent than that suggested by a Pascalian
analysis.27
One cannot fail to be disappointed that so much effort should, in
the end, produce such circumscribed results. On the other hand, Cohen
has delineated, more clearly than any other critic of the Pascalian
model of forensic probability, the points of tension between that theory
and actual practice. Moreover, he has investigated in detail an alterna-
tive model that we had at least no a priori grounds for rejecting.
It has been just over ten years since Kaplan published the first
substantial formal analysis of forensic probability and the processing of
probabilistic evidence.28 Since then, these issues have been vigorously
discussed in the journals, and we are now witnessing the appearance of
23. L. COHEN, supra note 20, at 221.
24. Id. 266.
25. Id. 268.
26. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
27. L. COHEN, supra note 20, t 269.
28. See Kaplan, supra note 1.
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the first book-length works devoted to this subject.2 9 Despite its limita-
tions, Cohen's ambitious attempt to construct a radically different
model of forensic probability is a positive addition to this emerging
genre.
29. See, e.g., R. EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF, AND PROBABILITY (1978); MODELING THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (S. Nagel ed. 1977). See also G. SHAFER, A MATHEMATICAL THEORY
OF EVIDENCE (1976).
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